PREFACE Page 11
1. INTRODUCTION Page 19
[1] The distinction between awareness of
self and knowledge of persons.
[2] Predilection of modern philosophy in
direction of knowledge of persons.
[3] Theories of self and awareness of self.
2. CONSCIOUSNESS Page 37
- Problems of Existence and Meaning
[1] It is shown that William James' denial
of consciousness is a rejection of a
philosophical theory of consciousness and
is no repudiation of consciousness itself.
[2] An argument centering on Ryle and
Wisdom to show that there is a basic sense
of consciousness.
[3] A rejection of the view that
'consciousness' is undefinable, followed
by a proposed definition along the lines
suggested by James Mill.
- The Nature of the Concept Page 49
[4] A comparison of the concepts 'conscious'
and 'colour' to show a disanalogy which if
not recognized leads to a false 'mosaic'
view of consciousness.
[5] Rejection of the view that
'consciousness' stands for a common
property of mental phenomena in favour
of treating it as a polymorphous concept.
[6] The concept of consciousness gains its
applicability through the existence of the
reader.
- Sir William Hamilton and His Critics Page 57
[7] Hamilton's theory of consciousness.
[8] The attack on Hamilton's Duality of
Consciousness by J.S. Mill, Shadworth
Hodgson, and William James.
[9] The implications of the historical
survey and the direction the self-approach
must take.
[10] The view of Samuel Alexander presented
as heading in the right direction.
[11] Conclusions presupposed in the
analysis offered in succeeding chapters.
3. ATTENTION Page 67
- Consciousness and Change
[1] The two dimensions of consciousness.
[2] T.H.Ribot on the dependence of
consciousness on change.
[3] A contrast between the theories of
attention of James Ward and William James.
[4] Attention seen as the structuring
of consciousness into foreground and
background.
- Rejection of the Notion of an Page 80
Attention-Free Consciousness
[5] The presence of attention in a pure
sensuous consciousness.
[6] Its presence in a state of reverie.
[7] Conclusions drawn from this study.
- The Varieties of Attention Page 92
[8] Rejection of Ribot's distinction
between 'spontaneous' attention and
'voluntary' attention.
[9] The weaknesses in Hamilton's theory of
attention.
[10] The relation between 'mere vital
attention' and 'voluntary' attention.
[11] 'Unordered' attention, 'interrogative'
attention, and 'executive' attention; an
alternative to the classification offered
by Hamilton and Ribot.
4. UNPROJECTED CONSCIOUSNESS Page 104
- The Structure of Consciousness
[1] Attention and unprojected consciousness
viewed as complements.
[2] The character of unprojected
consciousness.
- Unprojected Consciousness and Page 107
Interrogative Attention
[3] The logical character of ideational
elements.
[4] The question of the possibility of
simultaneous attention to a number of
objects.
[5] Answer given in terms of the notion of
a 'relevancy system'.
[6] Ribot's theory that attention demands
the suspension of change shown to be a
misconception which the notion of a
relevancy system can overcome.
- Unprojected Consciousness and Page 122
Executive Attention
[7] The role of kinaesthetic sensation
in executive attention.
[8] The logical status of physiological
processes in attention.
- The Logical Dependence of Mental Page 128
Images and Thoughts on Bodily Activity
[9] A defence of Ribot's theory that even
inner-directed attention (reflection) is
dependent on bodily activity.
[10] Arguments against the 'phantom
approach' according to which the
occurence of mental imagery is logically
independent of bodily activity.
[11] The alternative 'sentient approach'
defended in terms of the notion of the
'origin' of a mental image.
[12] Utilization of the distinction
between compatible and incompatible
activities in support of the sentient
approach.
[13] The most mental of all forms of
reflection - the having of thoughts -
held to be logically dependent on bodily
activity.
5. THE EXPERIENTIAL SELF Page 144
- The Self as Unprojected Consciousness
[1] The rationale of the theory.
[2] The elusiveness of the self explained.
[3] Rejection of the no-subject position.
- The Problems the Theory Solves Page 153
[4] Consideration of James's theory of the
self.
[5] Explanation of the connection between
bodily sensation and the self.
[6] Making of the self its own object only
partially possible.
[7] Analysis of Ayer's supplementation of
James's theory.
- Support from Unexpected Quarters Page 169
[8] The loss of self in mystical ecstasy.
[9] Theories forshadowing the one
presented here.
- A Defense against Some Objections Page 173
[10] Difficulties which the theory has to
surmount.
[11] An answer to Strawson.
6. YESTERDAY'S SELF Page 182
- The Past of a Self and the
Past of a Person
[1] The manner in which this is a concern
of the self-approach as distinct from a
concern of the persons approach.
[2] Distinction between subjective time
and objective time brought into account
for interruptions in consciousness.
- Awareness as a State and Attention Page 186
as an Activity
[3] The meaning I give to 'awareness'.
[4] The logical characteristics of verbs
of perception and the relation between
perceiving and awareness.
[5] The criteria of states and activities.
[6] The logic of 'awareness' and the logic
of 'attention'.
- The Dependence of a Persisting Page 206
Self on Sustaining Activity
[7]The relation between attention and
unprojected consciousness argued to demand
a revision of Ryle's adverbial theory of
attention.
[8] Application to perceptual concepts
of the distinction between states and
activities.
[9] The continuous creation of the self.
7. BODILY EXISTENCE Page 218
[1] Selves and their bodily
possibilities.
[2] Our kind of body.
[3] The point of contact between the
self-approach and the persons approach.
[4] Appeal to mental acts rendered unnecessary
by the present theory.
INDEX Page 235
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