PREFACE Page 11
1. INTRODUCTION Page 19
 The distinction between awareness of
self and knowledge of persons.
 Predilection of modern philosophy in
direction of knowledge of persons.
 Theories of self and awareness of self.
2. CONSCIOUSNESS Page 37
- Problems of Existence and Meaning
 It is shown that William James' denial
of consciousness is a rejection of a
philosophical theory of consciousness and
is no repudiation of consciousness itself.
 An argument centering on Ryle and
Wisdom to show that there is a basic sense
 A rejection of the view that
'consciousness' is undefinable, followed
by a proposed definition along the lines
suggested by James Mill.
- The Nature of the Concept Page 49
 A comparison of the concepts 'conscious'
and 'colour' to show a disanalogy which if
not recognized leads to a false 'mosaic'
view of consciousness.
 Rejection of the view that
'consciousness' stands for a common
property of mental phenomena in favour
of treating it as a polymorphous concept.
 The concept of consciousness gains its
applicability through the existence of the
- Sir William Hamilton and His Critics Page 57
 Hamilton's theory of consciousness.
 The attack on Hamilton's Duality of
Consciousness by J.S. Mill, Shadworth
Hodgson, and William James.
 The implications of the historical
survey and the direction the self-approach
 The view of Samuel Alexander presented
as heading in the right direction.
 Conclusions presupposed in the
analysis offered in succeeding chapters.
3. ATTENTION Page 67
- Consciousness and Change
 The two dimensions of consciousness.
 T.H.Ribot on the dependence of
consciousness on change.
 A contrast between the theories of
attention of James Ward and William James.
 Attention seen as the structuring
of consciousness into foreground and
- Rejection of the Notion of an Page 80
 The presence of attention in a pure
 Its presence in a state of reverie.
 Conclusions drawn from this study.
- The Varieties of Attention Page 92
 Rejection of Ribot's distinction
between 'spontaneous' attention and
 The weaknesses in Hamilton's theory of
 The relation between 'mere vital
attention' and 'voluntary' attention.
 'Unordered' attention, 'interrogative'
attention, and 'executive' attention; an
alternative to the classification offered
by Hamilton and Ribot.
4. UNPROJECTED CONSCIOUSNESS Page 104
- The Structure of Consciousness
 Attention and unprojected consciousness
viewed as complements.
 The character of unprojected
- Unprojected Consciousness and Page 107
 The logical character of ideational
 The question of the possibility of
simultaneous attention to a number of
 Answer given in terms of the notion of
a 'relevancy system'.
 Ribot's theory that attention demands
the suspension of change shown to be a
misconception which the notion of a
relevancy system can overcome.
- Unprojected Consciousness and Page 122
 The role of kinaesthetic sensation
in executive attention.
 The logical status of physiological
processes in attention.
- The Logical Dependence of Mental Page 128
Images and Thoughts on Bodily Activity
 A defence of Ribot's theory that even
inner-directed attention (reflection) is
dependent on bodily activity.
 Arguments against the 'phantom
approach' according to which the
occurence of mental imagery is logically
independent of bodily activity.
 The alternative 'sentient approach'
defended in terms of the notion of the
'origin' of a mental image.
 Utilization of the distinction
between compatible and incompatible
activities in support of the sentient
 The most mental of all forms of
reflection - the having of thoughts -
held to be logically dependent on bodily
5. THE EXPERIENTIAL SELF Page 144
- The Self as Unprojected Consciousness
 The rationale of the theory.
 The elusiveness of the self explained.
 Rejection of the no-subject position.
- The Problems the Theory Solves Page 153
 Consideration of James's theory of the
 Explanation of the connection between
bodily sensation and the self.
 Making of the self its own object only
 Analysis of Ayer's supplementation of
- Support from Unexpected Quarters Page 169
 The loss of self in mystical ecstasy.
 Theories forshadowing the one
- A Defense against Some Objections Page 173
 Difficulties which the theory has to
 An answer to Strawson.
6. YESTERDAY'S SELF Page 182
- The Past of a Self and the
Past of a Person
 The manner in which this is a concern
of the self-approach as distinct from a
concern of the persons approach.
 Distinction between subjective time
and objective time brought into account
for interruptions in consciousness.
- Awareness as a State and Attention Page 186
as an Activity
 The meaning I give to 'awareness'.
 The logical characteristics of verbs
of perception and the relation between
perceiving and awareness.
 The criteria of states and activities.
 The logic of 'awareness' and the logic
- The Dependence of a Persisting Page 206
Self on Sustaining Activity
The relation between attention and
unprojected consciousness argued to demand
a revision of Ryle's adverbial theory of
 Application to perceptual concepts
of the distinction between states and
 The continuous creation of the self.
7. BODILY EXISTENCE Page 218
 Selves and their bodily
 Our kind of body.
 The point of contact between the
self-approach and the persons approach.
 Appeal to mental acts rendered unnecessary
by the present theory.
INDEX Page 235